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Reborn Federalism in Western Water
Law: The New Melones Dam
Decision
By RODERICK WALSTON*

American federalism, wrought by early patriots who feared a concentration of national power, is a product of the unique history, tradition, and experience of the American nation. In response to historical
necessity or convenience, however, the federal tradition has been
eroded over the years by an increasing concentration of power at the
national level. The activities of all branches of the federal government
have contributed to this erosion; the judicial branch has more expansively defined federal power and the legislative and executive branches
have more willingly wielded it. This development, however, has been
partially reversed by the emergence of a new federalism, under which
both Congress' and the courts 2 have given new emphasis to the role of
*

A.B., 1958; LL.B. 1961. The author is a Deputy Attorney General for the State of

California. He represented California in California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978),
discussed herein. The views expressed are solely those of the author, and should not be
attributed to the State of California or any agency thereof.
I. Congress has recently enacted several laws that allow the states to exercise substantial authority in matters affecting national policy. For instance, the Clean Water Act of 1972
authorizes the states to adopt permit systems for the control of water pollution and to apply
their permit systems to federal agencies. See 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376, 1323 (West Supp.
1978). The Clean Air Act of 1977 similarly authorizes states to adopt implementation plans
for the control of air pollution and to apply their plans to federal agencies. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7642, 7418 (West Supp. 1978). The Deepwater Ports Act of 1975, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1501-1524 (1976), gives the U.S. Department of Transportation authority to license deepwater ports, but gives the states a veto power over the licensing of such ports. Id.
§§ 1503(c)(9)-(10), 1508. The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 14511464 (1976), encourages the states to develop management plans for the protection of their
coastal areas, and provides that the plans must follow guidelines set forth in the Act and
must be federally approved; federal agencies are required to comply with such plans "to the
maximum extent practicable." Id. § 1456(c)(l)-(2).
2. The Supreme Court recently held that Congress lacks constitutional power to apply
its minimum wage laws to the states qua employers, reversing its decision in Maryland v.
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
The Court has also held that the states do not necessarily waive their immunity from suit
under the eleventh amendment when engaged in activity regulated by Congress under its
commerce powers, modifying its decision in Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184, 186
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the states in our constitutional order. The federal tradition, once
threatened with dormancy, has recently gained new life.
These historical events are significant for purposes of this Article
in that they reflect, and in large part explain, events that have taken
place in the field of land reclamation. In 1902, Congress established a
national program to build dams that would conserve the West's sparse
water supply and reclaim its arid lands. 3 In keeping with the federal
tradition, Congress provided that the western states would control the
water stored behind the dams. Congress cast doubts on the continuing
viability of the state role in reclamation, however, by subsequently expanding the federal role without defining its exact scope. Moreover, as
the Supreme Court expanded the definition of federal power in other
areas, it expanded the definition of federal power in the field of reclamation, eventually holding that the federal government has exclusive
control of water stored behind federal dams. Little was left of the federal tradition that underlay Congress' original reclamation program,
which had recognized the states as having such control.
In its recent decision in California v. United States,4 known as the
New Melones decision, the Supreme Court abruptly changed the course
of western water law. It held that the states have a right to control the
water in federal dams to the extent not inconsistent with specific congressional directives. By accommodating federal and state interests
rather than perpetuating a pervasive federal supremacy, the Court gave
rebirth to the tradition of federalism in the field of reclamation. Its
decision further diffuses national power in an era in which the limits of
effective national power have been freshly appreciated, and, not coincidentally, provides another sign that the judicial activism of former
years has been replaced with a new sense of judicial restraint.
After examining the historic federal tradition in western water law
and the reasons why Congress chose to follow it in its original reclamation program, this Article will trace the erosion of this tradition by the
(1964). See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). See generally Heldt, The Tenth
Amendment Iceberg, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1645 (1979). In preemption cases, the Court now
appears to favor "a flexible conception of federal-state relations rather than one of absolute
federal supremacy." Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectiveson Federalism and
the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623, 641 (1975). On the same day that the Court
issued its decision in California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978), known as the New
Melones case, the Court also limited federal control of water under the reserved rights doctrine, thus broadening the states' rights to control water. See United States v. New Mexico,
438 U.S. 696 (1978); see text accompanying notes 53-56 infra.
3. See notes 5-13 & accompanying text infra.

4.

438 U.S. 645 (1978).
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general expansion of federal power over water in the West and by the
specific expansion of federal power in the field of reclamation. The
Article will then examine the Supreme Court's decision in the New
Melones case to see how the Court gave new meaning to the federal
tradition, even to the point of overruling several of its prior decisions.
Finally, this Article will demonstrate that the decision, rather than
solving all problems of federalism in the field of reclamation, opens the
door to new problems: in providing for an accommodation of federal
and state interests, the Court left open the exact kinds of interests to be
accommodated. After examining these new problems, this Article will
suggest how they should be solved.
The Reclamation Act of 1902
By the turn of the present century, the American nation had long
abandoned the notion that the American West was the "howling wilderness" depicted earlier by Daniel Webster.5 As part of its manifest
destiny, the nation had committed itself to the task of extending its
civilization to the lands of the West, lands recently won by treaty and
conquest. Since nature had deprived the area of a plentiful water supply, the lands could be made habitable and productive only by the intervention of man, by the construction of reclamation works that would
overcome the vagaries of nature. Encouraged by President Theodore
Roosevelt, 6 Congress decided to undertake a massive reclamation effort
on a national level. It authored the Reclamation Act of 1902, 7 which
provided for federal construction and operation of projects that would
divert, store and distribute the waters of the western states and
8
territories.
5.

1 KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS 8 (2d ed. 1912) [hereinafter cited as

KINNEY].

6. President Roosevelt stated, in his annual message to Congress in 1901: "Great storage works are necessary to equalize the flow of streams and to save the flood waters. Their
construction has been conclusively shown to be an undertaking too vast for private effort.
Nor can it best be accomplished by the individual States acting alone. Far-reaching interstate problems are involved; and the resources of single States would often be inadequate. It
35 CONG. REc. 6775
is properly a national function, in at least some of its features.
(1902).
7. Pub. L. No. 57-161, 32 Stat. 388-90 (current version at 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-600
(1976)). The act applies to the states of Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nevada, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota,
Utah, Washington and Wyoming. Pub. L. No. 57-161, § 1, 32 Stat. 388 (1902) (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 391 (1976)).
8. A major question faced by Congress, in deciding whether to pass the Act, was
whether reclamation was a national or local function. Those who opposed the Act, all from
states which received no direct benefits from its enactment, argued that reclamation was a
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In considering the Act, Congress devoted much attention to the
question of whether the allocation of water from the projects would be
controlled by the federal government or by the states. Some members
of Congress argued that if the federal government is to build and operate the projects, it should control the allocation of water from them;9
if reclamation is a national function, it should be fully controlled at
the national level. Others, including the western representatives who
drafted and most vigorously supported the Act, argued that this control
should rest with the states rather than the federal government,' 0 and
that the federal government should acquire its water rights for the
local function that should be undertaken by the states themselves, not by the federal government; the federal contribution, at most, should be limited to a cession of federal lands to the
states for reclamation purposes. See, e.g., 35 CONG. REc. 6670, 6682-6683 (1902) (remarks
of Rep. Ray); H.R. REP. No. 794, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-5 (1902) (Minority Rep.). Those
who supported the Act, however, including representatives of the western states that received direct benefits under the Act, argued that reclamation was a national function, at
least in terms of whether the projects should be built at the national or local level. See, e.g.,
35 CONG. REC. 6676 (1902) (remarks of Rep, Mondell); id. at 6673 (remarks of Rep. Newlands); H.R. REP. No. 794, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4, 7-8 (1902); S. REP. No. 254, 57th Cong.,
1st Sess. 5-6 (1902); H.R. REP. No. 1468, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4, 7-11 (1902). Some western representatives introduced bills prior to 1902 under which the federal government would
construct reclamation projects in the western states but the states would physically operate
and manage the projects. See, e.g., H.R. 14165, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., 34 CONG. REC. 2351
(1901). They argued that the western states lacked the financial capacity to build the
projects, and that the sprawling western desert would never bloom without a national reclamation undertaking. The latter view proved more appealing in an age of nationalism and
expansion, and Congress decided that the projects should be built and operated by the federal government rather than the states.
9. See, e.g., 35 CONG. REC. 6696 (1902) (remarks of Rep. Ray); H.R. REP. No. 794,
57th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1902) (Minority Rep.). A leading reclamation authority, George H.
Maxwell, wrote an article in which he argued that § 8 of the reclamation bill, in providing
for state control of water, would fail to protect "the right of the Government to a return of its
investment." Maxwell, "National Homemaker," Supplement, at 1 (April 1902).
10. For instance, the main proponent of the reclamation bill in the Senate, Senator
Clark of Wyoming, disclaimed the notion that "a great Government Bureau ... shall have
control of all the lands and waters in our arid regions." 35 CONG. REC. 2222 (1902). He
further stated: "The question of conservation of waters is one of national importance; the
question of reservoir sites and reservoir building is one that appeals to the Government as a
matter of national import, but the question of State or Territorial control of waters after
having been released from their bondage in the reservoirs which have been provided is a
separate and distinct proposition. . . . It is right that the General Government should control, should conserve, and should reservoir the head waters of these streams. In this it is a
national and not a State proposition. But in the distribution of these waters . . . it is right
and proper that the various States and Territories should control in the distribution. The
conditions in each and every State and Territory are different. What would be applicable in
one locality is totally and absolutely inapplicable in another." Id.
Similar statements were made during the debate in the House of Representatives. See
35 CONG. REC. 6676-6679 (1902) (remarks of Rep. Mondell); id. at 6770 (remarks of Rep.
Sutherland).
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projects in the same manner as private water users; I I because the western states traditionally had controlled the acquisition of water rights
and the allocation of their waters, they should exercise the same control
over water developed under the federal reclamation program. The latter view prevailed. At the behest of the western legislators, the Act
contained a provision, section 8, which stated that the Act should not

be construed as affecting state laws relating to the "control, appropriation, use, or distribution" of water, and directed the Secretary of Inte-

rior, in operating the projects, to "proceed in conformity with" such
state laws.' 2 Section 8 thus established a paramount principle of federalism in western water law, the principle that the states would control
11. Representative Mondell of Wyoming, the main proponent of the bill in the House
of Representatives, stated: "I can perhaps best illustrate. . . [the bill's] workings by indicating how the Secretary of the Interior, as the agent of the Government under this act, would
proceed. . . . It having been ascertained that a sufficient supply of water for the irrigation of
the lands in question was available and unappropriated and the feasibility of a project having been determined, the Secretary of the Interior would proceed to make the appropriation
of the necessary water by giving the notice and complying with the forms of law of the State
or Territory in which the works are located." 35 CONG. REC. 6678 (1902).
12. Section 8 provides: "That nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or
intended to affect or to in any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating
to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested
right acquired thereunder, and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of
this Act, shall proceed in conformity with such laws, and nothing herein shall in any way
affect any right of any State or of the Federal Government or of any landowner, appropriator, or user of water in, to, or from any interestate stream or the waters thereof: Provided,
That the right to the use of water acquired under the provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of
the right." Pub. L. No. 57-161, 32 Stat. 390 (1902) (current version at 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383
(1976)).
The proviso in § 8, requiring that water be used only on "appurtenant" lands and that
"beneficial use" is the measure of the water right, was apparently intended to limit the disparity in the water laws of the western states. By 1902, most states had adopted the appropriation doctrine, which limits water to one who puts it to a "beneficial use." See text
accompanying notes 14-21 infra. Some states, although adopting the appropriation doctrine,
retained elements of the riparian doctrine, which provides that water can be used only on
lands appurtenant to the water. See note 17 & accompanying text infra. By utilizing both
the appurtenancy concept and the beneficial use concept, the proviso in § 8 may have been
intended to create a hybrid right that assimilated certain features of both the riparian and
appropriation doctrines. During the congressional debates, it was explained that the proviso
would result in water rights "most approved by centuries of irrigation practice, and such as
will absolutely insure the user in his right and prevent the possibility of speculative use of
water rights . . . [and] will undoubtedly tend to uniformity and perfection of water laws
throughout the region affected." H.R. REP. No. 1468, 57th Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1902). See
also 35 CONG. REC. 6679 (1902) (remarks of Rep. Mondell). Since the riparian doctrine was
thought to be socialistic and the appropriation doctrine to result in monopolies, see United
States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 750 (1950), perhaps it was thought that the
proviso would limit the defects of both doctrines.
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13
the use of water developed under the federal reclamation program.
In providing for state control of water, section 8 followed the historic federal tradition that recognized the states as the source of water
rights in the West. To fully understand the raisond'etre of section 8, it
is necessary to review that federal tradition more fully.

The Federal Tradition: State Control of Water
Development of the Appropriation Doctrine
The riparian doctrine, under which landowners are entitled to the
use of water flowing past their land, is a common law doctrine that is
the basis of water law in the eastern states.14 The miners who hurried
westward in search of gold after its discovery in California in 1848 developed a custom that departed from the riparian doctrine; under this
new custom, the first miner to divert water to his claim was recognized
as having a prior right to the water as against miners who appeared
later on the scene. I" This custom was adopted in the manufacturing
and agricultural industries, was recognized by the early courts and legislatures, and eventually ripened into a formal doctrine of water law,
the doctrine of prior appropriation.
Under the appropriation doctrine, the first person to appropriate
water for the beneficial use has a prior right to its use, as long as the
beneficial use continues. 16 The doctrine was tailored to the exigencies
of the West, which nature has disfavored with a sparse water supply.
By tying the right to water to its most beneficial use rather than its
proximity to land, the doctrine provided for the most efficient use of
water. The appropriation doctrine has now been adopted in all western
13. The meaning of § 8 has received much attention by commentators of western water
law. See Goldberg, Interposition-Wild West Water Style, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1964); Meyers, The Colorado Riper, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1966); Sax, Problems of Federalismin Reclamation Law, 37 U. CoLo. L. REV. 49 (1964); Sato, Water Resources-Comments Upon the
Federal-State Relationship, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 43 (1960); Trelease, Reclamation Water
Rights, 32 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 464 (1960); Note, Allocation of Water From FederalReclamation Projects. Can the States Decide?, 4 ECOL. L.Q. 343 (1974).
14. See United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 745 (1950); W. HUTCHINS, CALIFORNIA LAW OF WATER RIGHTS 178-256 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HUTCHINS]; I
KINNEY, supra note 5, at 450-452, 977-92; 1 WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES
68-70 (3d ed. 1911) [hereinafter cited as WIEL]; Bannister, The Question of FederalDisposition of State Waters in the Priority States, 28 HARV. L. REV. 270 (1914).

15. See generally United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 742-50 (1950);
California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 153-57 (1935);
Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 456-61 (1878); HUTCHINS, supra note 14, at 41-45; POMEROY,
WATER RIGHTS chs. 2, 3 (1893); 1 WIEL, supra note 14, at 71-85.
16.

See authorities cited note 15, supra.
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states, although some states retain elements of the riparian doctrine and
7

thus have dual systems of water rights.'
An important component of the appropriation doctrine is that the
determination whether water can be put to a beneficial use, and thus

whether a water right should exist, is made by the state.' 8 The appropriation doctrine thereby vests the states with broad control of water,
unlike the riparian doctrine in its common law form. The states made
little effort to exercise this control in the early years, however, beyond
recognizing water rights based on the priority of use. For instance,

California developed a statutory scheme in the 1850's for the allocation
of water between the mining and agricultural industries,' 9 but failed to

regulate the allocation of water within each industry. With increasing
demands upon their water, however, many states became conscious of
the need to regulate such allocations. Following Wyoming's example,
many states adopted administrative systems of water rights, under
which the state would issue a permit to an applicant for the right to use

water if the state determines that the proposed use is "beneficial" and

"reasonable" and in the "public interest. ' 20 These administrative sys-

17. 2 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAW IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 6-14
(1974). Some states, following the example of Colorado, have exclusively adopted the appropriation doctrine, wholly rejecting the riparian doctrine. Id. Other states, following the
example of California, have adopted both appropriation and riparian doctrines. Id.; see
Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674 (1886). In California, it was held that, in a conflict
between an appropriator and a riparian, the riparian right can be exercised although it results in an unreasonable use of water. Herminghaus v. Southern California Edison Co., 200
Cal. 81, 252 P. 607 (1926). This decision led to the passage of a constitutional amendment in
1928, which provides that both riparian and appropriative rights in California can exist only
to the extent that the water use is both "beneficial" and "reasonable." CAL. CONST. art. X,
§ 2 (formerly art. XIV, § 3); Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 217 Cal. 673, 22 P.2d 5 (1933);
Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 429 P.2d 889, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1967).
18. See authorities cited note 15, supra.
19. HUTCHINS, supra note 14, at 47-48.
20. The Wyoming law, adopted in 1891, provided that the state engineer must approve
applications for water rights if he determines that the water will be put to a "beneficial use,"
and that "where the proposed use conflicts with existing rights, or threatens to prove detrimental to the public interest, it shall be the duty of the State Engineer to reject such application and refuse to issue the permit asked for." 2 WIEL, supra note 14, at 1557-58.
Contemporaneously with the passage of the Reclamation Act of 1902, the states of Idaho,
Nevada and Utah also adopted appropriative permit systems under which "an application
must be made to the State engineer for permission to make an appropriation." U.S. DEP'T
OF THE INTERIOR, PROCEEDINGS OF SECOND CONFERENCE OF ENGINEERS OF THE RECLAMATION SERVICE 223-24 (1905). California's permit system, adopted in 1914, provides that

the Water Resources Control Board can issue a permit only if the proposed use is "reasonable and beneficial," and only if the Board imposes such conditions as are necessary to
protect the "reasonable and beneficial use" of water and to protect the "public interest."
CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 (formerly art. XIV, § 3); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1201, 1240, 1253,
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tems have been adopted by most western states and are the essence of
2
their modern appropriation laws. '
Federal reclamation authorities have consistently followed state
appropriation law, including state permit requirements, in acquiring
and using water under the federal reclamation program, often acknowledging that section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 requires them to
do so.22 For their part, the states have usually accomodated the federal
program by granting the water rights sought by federal authorities;
many states have granted preferential treatment for federal water rights
as against other water rights. 2 3 The federal program has thus been carried forth largely in a spirit of harmony rather than animosity, with
1255, 1257, 1375 (West 1971); Temescal Water Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 44 Cal. 2d
90, 280 P.2d 1 (1955).
21. Of the 19 western states, all but 3 require an appropriator of surface water to obtain
an appropriative permit from the state. I W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE
NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 302 (1974). The exceptions are Hawaii, Colorado and Montana. Hawaii, which is not an arid state, does not recognize the appropriation doctrine.
Colorado and Montana have judicial rather than administrative systems for statutory adjudications of appropriative rights. Montana additionally provides that such rights can be
acquired by posting of notice and filing of records. Id.
22. See, e.g., California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 675-76 (1978); United States v.
Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 735 n.9, 740 n.14 (1950). In California, the U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation has applied to California's Water Resources Control Board for 51
permits to appropriate water for the Central Valley Project since 1938, and the California
agency has approved 41 such applications, most of which are subject to conditions. The
federal agency has never acquired its water rights for the project without complying with
California law. Affidavit of Bill Dendy, Executive Officer of Water Resources Control
Board, Appendix, vol. II, at 2, California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
In 1950, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation provided a statement of its water rights practices in the western states, in response to a request from the Supreme Court in its deliberations in United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950). The statement
declared that "it is the practice of the Government to make appropriations of water from
unnavigable streams in accordance with the provisions of State law." Federal-State Water
Rights: Hearingson S. 1375 Before the Sub- Comm. on Irrigationand Reclamation of the Sen.

Comm. on Int. and Ins. Affairs, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 320 (1964). The same practice is followed with respect to waters of navigable streams. Id. The only exception to this practice is
with respect to certain projects located on the lower Colorado River, which are governed by
the Boulder Canyon Project Act, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 617617t (1976)). Different appropriation practices are followed with respect to these projects,
according to the statement, for the reason that, "at the time that it [the project] was built, the
opposition to the project in Arizona was such that, even if an appropriation under the laws
of Arizona had been required, none could have been made." Id.
23. For example, some states have withdrawn water from appropriation so that the
water can be subsequently appropriated by the Secretary of the Interior for the federal
projects; some have allowed the Secretary to withdraw unappropriated water prior to applying for a water fight; and some-such as California-have assigned their own water rights to
the Secretary of the Interior. See Trelease, Reclamation Water Rights, 32 RoCKY MTN. L.
REV. 464, 466-467 (1960).
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federal authorities complying with state laws and state authorities advancing rather than hindering the purposes of the federal program.
Congressional Recognition of the Appropriation Doctrine
Long before the states developed their administrative systems, at a
time when the appropriation doctrine was in its infancy, the rights created under the doctrine were imperiled by the constitutional might of
the United States. Early judicial decisions, noting that the United
States acquired ownership and control of the public domain lands in
what is now California by signing the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
with Mexico in 1848,24 reasoned that the federal government's water
rights were superior to those of the miners. 25 Moreover, the miners'
rights were jeopardized by the rights of many settlers who had acquired
public domain lands under federal laws, such as the Homestead Act of
1862;26 since these settlers succeeded to the rights of the United States,
their rights might also be superior to those of the miners.
To remove the cloud that hung over the miners' claims, Congress
passed the Mining Act of 1866.27 This act authorized the miners to
explore and occupy the public domain lands and provided that the
right to use water on the lands was subject to "local customs, laws and
the decisions of the courts."' 28 By recognizing existing water rights
based on local laws and customs, these acts provided the first congres29
sional recognition of the new appropriation doctrine.
Having protected the miners' claims, Congress turned to the task
of encouraging the settlement and reclamation of the water-scarce
lands of the West. It passed the Desert Land Act of 1877,30 which
24. 9 Stat. 922 (1848).
25. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1885); Moore v. Smaw, 17 Cal. 199 (1861); Boggs v.
Mining Co., 14 Cal. 279, 374 (1859), appeal dismissed, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 304 (1865). The
notion that the United States controls the public domain lands, although not surprising today, was a shocking revelation to the frontier villages and communities of the early West.
The fear grew that the United States might oust the miners from their claims at the slightest
whim. Indeed, shortly after the Civil War, the Secretary of the Treasury proposed to pay the
war debt by selling the lands acquired by the miners and claiming the proceeds for the
federal government. I WIEL, supra note 14, at 105.
26. Ch.75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862) (formerly codified at 43 U.S.C. § 161 (1970) (repealed
1976)).
27. Ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251 (1866) (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1976)).
28. 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1976).
29. See generalo California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 655-57 (1978); Broder v.
Natoma Water & Mining Co., 101 U.S. 274, 276 (1880); Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 45961(1878).
30. Ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (1877) (current version at 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-323 (1976)). The
Desert Land Act applies to California, Colorado, Oregon, Nevada, Washington, Idaho,
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granted such lands to anyone willing to settle on them. The Act also
provided that the settlers' rights to water "shall depend on bona fide
prior appropriation," and that unappropriated, nonnavigable waters
not acquired by the settlers were "free for the appropriation and use of
the public for irrigation, mining and manufacturing purposes." 3' The
Act thus appeared to make the appropriation doctrine generally applicable to the nonnavigable waters of the West, even as to settlers who
acquired their rights under federal law.32 However, the Act left open
the question whether the appropriation laws to be applied were those of
the states and territories or were to be found in an undefined body of
federal common law.
This question was not answered until more than half century later,
in CaliforniaOregon Power Co. v. Beaver PortlandCement Co. 33 There,
the Supreme Court held that the Desert Land Act of 1877 had "severed" the nonnavigable waters from the lands of the public domain,
thus providing for state control of such waters. 34 The federal government, although retaining its control of the land, had thereby surrendered much of its control of the water to the states. Although settlers
may acquire the lands under federal law, their water rights are dependent on state law. The Court also held that the Act authorized the
states to adopt whatever water laws they chose-the appropriation doctrine, the riparian doctrine, or a combination of the two. 35 The severance of land and water applied to lands acquired under other federal
acts as well as under the Desert Land Act of 1877.36 According to the
Court, the states have a "plenary right" to control their nonnavigable
waters, 37 subject only to certain federal constitutional powers. 38 The
decision, by recognizing state law as the source of water rights in the
West, resulted in broad state control of water.
Montana, Utah, Wyoming, Arizona, New Mexico, North Dakota, and South Dakota. 43
U.S.C. § 323 (1976).
31. Ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (1877) (current version at 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-323 (1976)).

32.

See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 143-44 (1976); California Oregon

Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 155-58 (1935); Note, Federal-State
Conflicts Over the Control of Western Waters, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 967 (1960).
33. 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
34. Id. at 158-62.
35. 1d. at 163-64.

36. Id. at 161-62.
37. "What we hold is that following the act of 1877, if not before, all non-navigable
waters then a part of the public domain became publicijuris,subject to the plenary control of
the designated states, including those since created out of the territories named, with the

right in each to determine for itself to what extent the rule of appropriation or the commonlaw rule in respect of riparian rights should obtain." Id. at 163-64.
38. See text accompanying notes 42-58 infra.
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Equal Footing Doctrine
The states were also recognized as having broad powers over their
navigable waters under the equal footing doctrine. When the original
thirteen states formed the Union, they retained certain attributes of
their sovereignty, including control of the beds and shores of their navigable waters and, apparently, of the waters themselves. 39 When other
states were admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original states, they acquired similar control of their beds, shores, and waters.4" The equal footing doctrine, by equalizing the sovereign powers
of the various states, thus provided the western states with the same
broad control of their navigable waters that was enjoyed by the original
thirteen states.
In enacting section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, Congress
followed and extended the tradition of state control of water which it
had recognized and approved in the prior century. Just as Congress
had earlier recognized state law as the source of water rights in the
West, it recognized state law as the source of federal water rights under
the 1902 Act; just as the states had historically controlled the use of
water, they would control the use of water under the new federal reclamation program. Section 8 thus represents a continuation of the tradition of federal deference to state law that had governed the West's
waters prior to the inauguration of the federal reclamation program.
Federal Rights to Control Water
Because Congress had provided for state control of water in the
Desert Land Act of 1877 and related acts, 4 1 some thought that the western states had the right to control water uses by the federal government,
not just by private users.42 Under this line of reasoning, the states ac39. See, e.g., Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9 (1971); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S.
707, 716-17 (1950); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935); The Abby Dodge, 223
U.S. 166, 174 (1912); Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 1, 52 (1906); Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 259-62 (1891); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 394 (1876); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 223-24 (1845). But cf. Arizona v. California,
373 U.S. 546, 597 (1963) (the states acquired control only of the beds and shores of their
navigable waters, not the waters themselves).
40. See, e.g., Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971); United States v. Texas, 339
U.S. 707, 715-17 (1950); United States v. Oregon, 195 U.S. 1, 14 (1935).
41. See notes 30-32 & accompanying text supra.
42. See MEAD, IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS 372 (1903); 1 WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE
WESTERN STATES §§ 108-12 (3d ed. 1911). See generally Hanks, Peace West of/the 98th

Meridian-4Solution to Federal-StateConflicts Over Western Waters, 23 RUTGERS L. REV.
33, 37-39 (1968); Morreale, Federal-State Conflicts over Western Waters-4 Decade of 4t-
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quired absolute ownership of their water, and their rights were thus
superior to those of the federal government. This argument was
soundly rejected in a series of Supreme Court decisions. Without passing on the question whether the water is owned by the states or the
federal government,4 3 the Court has definitively ruled that the states'
authority to control water is subject to Congress' paramount constitutional powers, particularly as found in the Commerce Clause44 and the
Property Clause 45 of the U.S. Constitution.4 6 This constitutional limitation on the states' authority made the ownership question of academic interest only; the federal government has imperium, if not
dominium, over the waters of the West.
This federal imperium, in limiting the historic tradition of state
control of water, 47 undermines much of the rationale of section 8 of the
Reclamation Act of 1902, which was to continue the tradition in the
field of reclamation. The directive of the section, if not its rationale,
remains unaffected by the federal imperium, however. Since the section
mandates the Secretary of the Interior to "proceed in conformity with"
state laws, the Secretary cannot proceed otherwise under the federal
commerce or property powers. Congress has, in effect, relinquished its
constitutional power to control water in the field of reclamation.
The matter is not as simple as that, however. The emergence of
the federal imperium, reflecting a judicial trend to enlarge federal control of water and to narrow state control, established a climate that disfavored a broad construction of state power under section 8. This
climate largely explains judicial decisions prior to the New Melones
case that virtually emasculated state power to control water stored behind federal dams. 48 Therefore, to understand the forces that were at
work in the New Meones case, it is helpful to examine the nature and
scope of the federal imperium over water as found in the commerce and
property powers.
tempted ClarifjingLegislation, 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 423, 431-33 (1966); Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CALIF. L. REV. 638 (1957); Note, Federal-State
Conflicts over the Control of Western Waters, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 967, 972-77 (1960).
43. See Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 290-91 (1958); Nebraska v.
Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 611-16 (1945).

44. U.S.

CONST.

art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

45. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
46. See, e.g., Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1976); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597-98 (1963); California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 159-62 (1935).
47. See notes 14-40 & accompanying text supra.
48. See text accompanying notes 94-110 infra.
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Scope of Federal Commerce and Property Powers

The federal commerce power has been traditionally construed as
authorizing the federal government to control water to the extent necessary to promote the navigability of navigable waters. 49 This power has
been broadly construed to provide for federal control of water for purposes that are only distantly related to navigation, such as project
power purposes, 50 and to apply to nonnavigable waters that flow into
navigable waters. 5' The power has never been construed, however, as
applying when navigation and navigable waters are not affected in any
52
way.

Unlike the federal commerce power, the federal property power
provides a basis for federal control of nonnavigable waters. At one
time, this power was regarded as no more than a source of federal control of water for use on Indian reservations.5 3 The modern judicial development of the reserved rights doctrine, however, has expanded the

scope of the property power. Under this doctrine, the federal government has the right to use water that is necessary to serve the purposes of

any federal land that is reserved or withdrawn from the public domain,
whether or not the land includes an Indian reservation.5 4 This doctrine
49. See United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899); Gilman v.
Philadelpha, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
50. United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229, 231-33 (1960);
Oklahoma v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 522-23 (1941).
51. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co., 174 U.S. 690, 699-706 (1899).
52. See notes 63-64 & accompanying text infra.
53. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908); see United States v. Powers, 305 U.S.
527 (1939); United States v. Walker River Irrig. Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939). In
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 85-100 (1907), the Court construed the property power as
authorizing the United States to use water for the benefit of federal lands, but stated that
"[w]e do not mean that its [Congress'] legislation can override state laws in respect to the
general subject of reclamation." Id. at 92.
54. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978); Cappaert v. United States,
426 U.S. 128, 138-42 (1976); United States v. District Court, 401 U.S. 520 (1971); Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546, 595-601 (1963). See generaly Kiechel & Green, RiparianRights
Revisited: Legal Basis/orFederalInstream Flow Rights, 16 NAT. REsOURCES J. 969 (1976);
Ranquist, The Winters Doctrine andHow It Grew.- FederalReservation ofRights to the Use of
Water, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REv. 639; Note, New Mexico's NationalForestsandthe ImpliedReservation Doctrine, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 975 (1976); Note, Expansion ofthe Reservation of
Water Rights Doctrine, 56 NEB. L. REv. 410 (1977). In United States v. New Mexico, 438
U.S. 696 (1978), the Supreme Court held that the reserved-rights doctrine applies only to
"primary" federal purposes of the reserved lands, not "secondary" purposes. For purposes
of determining the priority of the federal reserved water right in relation to private rights,
the federal right is deemed to be created at the time that the lands are reserved or withdrawn
from the public domain. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963). The Supreme
Court has, in some cases, defined the reserved rights doctrine as based on both the federal
commerce power and the federal property power. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S.
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is based on the assumption that Congress, in providing for state control
of water in the Desert Land Act of 1877 and other acts, reserved the
right to use water as needed on the federal lands. The severance of
5
land and water in the public domain, as noted in the Beaver Portland"
56
case, does not apply to water that is necessary to serve federal lands.
The reserved rights doctrine thus rests on twin pillars, one constitutional and the other statutory: it provides a constitutional basis for the
federal government to acquire water for use on federal lands, and provides a statutory presumption that Congress means to exercise this
power independently of state law at the time that it reserves or withdraws federal lands.
Constitutional questions aside, there can be little question that the
reserved rights doctrine is not applicable under the Reclamation Act of
1902. Section 8 overcomes the presumption, inherent in the doctrine,
that Congress intends to acquire water independently of state law.
Moreover, the presumption would seem of doubtful validity since the
water is distributed for use by nonfederal users on nonfederal lands,
rather than for traditional federal purposes. 57 In Nebraska v.
Wyoming,"5 the Supreme Court arrived at this result for the wrong reason. It stated that the reserved rights doctrine is not applicable under
the 1902 Act because the water right under the Act is held by
nonfederal users who ultimately receive the water, not by the federal
government itself. 59 The federal government rather than the
nonfederal user, however, diverts the water, applies to the state for the
water right, and, in signing contracts with nonfederal users, decides
how, by whom, and in what amounts the water will be used. Moreover,
the federal government, in operating its modem, multi-purpose
projects, does not distribute all project water to private users, but instead often uses part of the water to maintain instream flows for the
protection of fish and wildlife, water quality control, and related purposes. Since this water is not used by nonfederal users, the right to the
water obviously does not repose in them. Thus, there can be little ques128 (1976); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). However, in the New Melones case,
the Court defined the doctrine as based only on the property power, not on the commerce
right to promote navigation. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 662 (1978). Most
commentators have also defined the reserved rights doctrine as based on the property power,
not the commerce power. See, e.g., Note, Expansion of the Reservation of Water Rights Doctrine, 56 NEB. L. REv. 410 (1977).

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See text accompanying notes 33-38 supra.
Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 446-48 (1955).
See text accompanying note 122 infra.
325 U.S. 589 (1945).
Id. at 629; accord, Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 95 (1937).
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tion that the water right is held by the federal government, not the
nonfederal user. The reserved rights doctrine is inapplicable under the
1902 Act because of section 8, not, as stated in Nebraska, because of the
identity of the appropriator.
Federal Constitutional Powers to Acquire Reclamation Water
This analysis raises an interesting question about the constitutional right of the federal government to acquire water for reclamation
purposes without complying with state law. The Supreme Court has
never definitively answered the question. It has stated, however, that
the federal reclamation program is sustainable under either the commerce or property powers;60 presumably, the federal right to obtain
water for the program is also sustainable under these powers. Certainly
the commerce power can sustain the federal right to acquire water to
the extent that the project serves a navigation purpose, such as flood
control. It has never been held, however, that the federal right to acquire water for many other project purposes, such as irrigation, is also
sustainable under the commerce power. Moreover, if the water is not
navigable, the commerce power would not be applicable in any event,
at least in its traditional sense.
In FederalPower Commission v. Oregon,6 1 the so-called Pelton
Dam case, the Supreme Court was called on to determine whether the
federal government has the right to license a private power project, and
presumably to authorize water for the project, when the waters in question are not navigable. Rather than expand the commerce power to
include nonnavigable waters, the Court held that the federal right is
sustainable under the property power because the lands that abutted
the project had been reserved from the public domain. The decision
suggests that the federal right to obtain water for reclamation projects
under the Reclamation Act of 1902 is also sustainable under the property power, when the lands abutting the projects are reserved from the
public domain.62 This result is unsound, however. The property power
60. See Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294 (1958); United States v.
Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 738 (1950). In both cases, the Court also stated that
the federal reclamation program is sustainable under the General Welfare Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8. Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294 (1958); United
States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 738 (1950). In the New Melones case, however, the Court failed to mention the General Welfare Clause as relevant in establishing
federal reclamation powers. See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 662 (1978).
61. 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
62. Since the reserved-rights doctrine is applicable only where the United States
reserves lands from the public domain, see text accompanying notes 54-56 supra,it is appar-
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would seem applicable only where the water is acquired for use on the
federal lands, for the purpose of providing benefits to the federal lands.
It has little relevance where, as in the field of reclamation, the water is
principally distributed to nonfederal lands to provide benefits for farmers and other nonfederal users.
Under these circumstances, the federal right should be sustained
under the commerce power, not the property power. Indeed, since the
water is distributed to farmers, cities, and industries, its use results in
the production of foods and goods that will find their way to interstate
markets. In light of this impact on interstate commerce, it is of little
consequence that the commerce may be unrelated to navigation or generated by waters that are not navigable. The commerce power has been
liberally construed as the basis for a wide range of federal programs
that provide national benefits in other areas, 63 and should be construed
as the basis for the federal reclamation program, which provides national benefits in the fields of agriculture, industry, and power development. Accordingly, at least in the field of reclamation, there is little
justification for confining the commerce power to matters involving
64
navigation and navigable waters.
In any event, the expansive judicial definition of federal power in
nonreclamation areas created a hostile context for a generous interpretation of state power in the reclamation area. The context worsened
with the Supreme Court's recent development of a rule of statutory
ently inapplicable where it acquires such lands by purchase or condemnation. In the latter
situation, the United States is acquiring private rights that were subject to state control
under the Desert Land Act of 1877 and related acts, and it has never been held that the
property power authorizes the United States to acquire such rights without complying with
state law. Hence, the United States can apparently acquire such rights independently of
state law only under other constitutional powers, such as the commerce power.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). See text accompanying note 50 supra.
64. It has been held that the exercise of the federal navigation power authorizes the
taking of private water rights without the payment of compensation. See, e.g., United States
v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956); United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311
U.S. 377 (1940); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913). However, it
would seem that the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution, which requires the payment
of compensation for the taking of other forms of property under the federal commerce
power, should be construed to also require the payment of compensation for the taking of
water rights under the navigation power. See, e.g., Morreale, Federal-State Conflict Over
Western Waters-A Decade of Attempted 'Clarif5ingLegislation', 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 423,
512 (1966). In any event, in United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950),
the Court held that § 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 requires the payment of compensation for the taking of private water rights under the Act. Hence, the no-compensation rule is
not applicable under that Act. Id. at 727-56.
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construction that the states cannot regulate federal activities in the absence of "clear and unambiguous" congressional authorization; such
authorization was found lacking by the Court in actions to determine
whether the states can regulate air and water pollution by federal agencies. 6 5 Under this rule, any lack of clarity in section 8, such as its failure to specifically mention the administrative permit systems developed
67
by most western states, 66 invites a narrow interpretation of its effect.
This rule, and the entire judicial construction of broad federal powers
in nonreclamation areas, cast doubts on the role of the states in the field
of reclamation.
Conflicts Between Federal and State Policies
The states' role in the field of reclamation was further clouded by
reclamation policies developed by Congress and the Secretary of the
Interior under authority of the Reclamation Act of 1902 and amendatory acts. Many of Congress' substantive policies, such as those limiting the distribution of water, are in potential conflict with policies
worked out by the states under section 8. The Secretary of the Interior,
entrusted by Congress with broad discretion to carry forth the purposes
of the federal reclamation program, has developed administrative policies that are also in potential conflict with state policies.
Most of these federal policies were developed after the enactment
of section 8 in 1902, and Congress may not have fully understood or
appreciated the magnitude of the conflicts when it enacted the section.
Certainly Congress has failed to provide a precise method for their resolution, either in section 8 or elsewhere. Thus, as Congress has expanded the scope and complexity of its reclamation program, it has
given rise to new questions relating to federalism in western water law.
It has sketched its reclamation principles with a broad brush, and left
to the courts the task of resolving the clash between federal and state
powers arising from these principles.
65. See Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 178-81 (1976); Environmental Protection
Agency v. California, 426 U.S. 200, 211 (1976); Walston, State ControlofFederalPollution:
Taking the Stick Away From the States, 6 ECOL. L.Q. 429 (1977).
66. See notes 20-21 & accompanying text supra.
67. In the New Melones case, the lower appellate court held that Congress had not
"clearly and unambiguously" authorized the states to apply their administrative permit systems to federal agencies, because § 8 failed to specifically refer to such systems. See United
States v. California, 558 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd,438 U.S. 645 (1978).
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The Reclamation Act of 1902 and Amendatory Laws
An example of this clash can be found in the original reclamation
law, the Reclamation Act of 1902. In order to discourage the acquisition of water by monopolies, the Act provides that water will not be
made available on lands exceeding 160 acres or to landowners who do
not reside on their lands. 6 8 Further, the Act authorizes the Secretary of
the Interior to adopt rules and regulations to carry out these and other
provisions of the act.6 9 Nothing in the Act, however, indicates whether
the antimonopoly provisions are paramount to state laws, 70 or whether
the Secretary's power to adopt rules and regulations limits the states'
powers under section 8.
These federal ambiguities were compounded by congressional acts
that amended the Reclamation Act of 1902, and that wove a more intricate web of congressional policies in potential conflict with state policies. Illustrative of these problems are congressional acts passed in
1911, 1920, and 1939.
The first Act, the Warren Act of 1911,71 provides for the sale of
surplus water when a project impounds more water than is needed for
reclamation purposes. The Act contains a provision declaring that it is
not to be construed as enlarging federal control of water, 72 and the legislative history indicates that this provision was intended to ensure that
the Secretary would comply with state law under the Act. 73 However,
the Act also authorized the Secretary to enter into contracts for the sale
of water "upon such terms as he may determine to be just and
proper. '74 Did the Act limit the states' authority under section 8 by
precluding the states from barring the sale of surplus water? Did the
68. Pub. L. No. 57-161, § 5, 32 Stat. 389 (1902) (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 431
(1976)).
69. Pub. L. No. 57-161, § 10, 32 Stat. 390 (1902) (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 373

(1976)).
70. See text accompanying notes 94-95 infra.
71.
72.

Pub. L. No. 61-406, 36 Stat. 925 (1911) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 523-25 (1976)).
43 U.S.C. § 524 (1976).

73.

This provision was inserted, it was explained, "to allay and set aside any suspicion

that anyone might entertain that the Government had the right to the water." 46 CONG.
Rec. 2783 (1911) (remarks of Rep. Reeder). The House report, in explaining the provision,
quoted from a report submitted by the Secretary of the Interior: 'Section 8 of the reclama-

tion act provides, among other things, in effect that the use and distribution of water appropriated and impounded by the Secretary of the Interior under said act shall conform with
the state laws, and Congress could not otherwise provide, for the reason, as stated by Mr.
Justice Brewer, in Kansas v. Colorado (106 U.S. 46, 92), "We do not mean that its legislation
can override state laws in respect to the general subject of reclamation." H.R. REP. No.
2002, 61st Cong., 3d Sess. 3 (1911).
74. 43 U.S.C. § 523 (1976).
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Act, in authorizing the Secretary to impose terms on the sale of water,
prevent the states from imposing their own terms? The Warren Act
failed to answer these questions.
The 1920 Act 75 expanded the purposes of the federal reclamation

program, originally limited to irrigation, to include nonirrigation purposes as well. The Act provided authority for the construction and op-

eration of multi-purpose projects that would make water available for
subsidiary nonirrigation purposes, such as domestic, industrial, power,
and recreational purposes. The congressional debates reflected an expectation that the Secretary would comply with state law under the
Act;76 this result would effectively expand the scope of section 8, which

on its face provides only for state control of water for "irrigation" purposes, to include other project purposes as well. The Act also contained

a provision, however, authorizing the Secretary to enter into contracts
for the use of nonirrigation water "upon such conditions of delivery,
use and payment as he may deem proper."' 77 By apparently giving the
states and the Secretary control over the same subject matter, the 1920

Act further compounded the problems of federalism.
The Reclamation Project Act of 193978 substantially amended the
basic reclamation law by developing, among other things, a comprehensive scheme for the payment of construction charges on the federal
projects. The Act was subsequently amended to include a provision
identical to section 8,7 9 in order to ensure, according to legislative re-

ports, that the basic policy of section 8 would be followed under the
new Act.80 The Act of 1939 vested the Secretary with broad discretion

to carry out the purposes of the Act, however, by signing contracts with
water users, adopting rules and regulations, and so forth. 8 ' Again, the

Act failed to provide any guidelines for the resolution of conflicts between federal and state powers.
75. Pub. L. No. 66-147, 41 Stat. 451 (1920) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 521 (1976)).
76. According to Representative Mondell: "[The Secretary] has no authority except as
we give him authority as an agent to do what any other agent could do under the State law;.
and we provide here that, acting as the agent or the trustee of these people, he may, of the
water diverted under the State law, provide for its use for certain purposes incidental to the
use for irrigation.

77.
78.
(1976)).
79.
80.
Sess. 5
81.

. .

."

59 CONG. REC. 2981 (1920).

43 U.S.C. § 521 (1976).
Pub. L. No. 76-260, 53 Stat. 1187 (1939) (current version at 43 U.S.C. §§ 485-485k
Pub. L. No. 84-643, 70 Stat. 484 (1956) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 485h-4 (1976)).
S.REP. No. 2241, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1956); H.R. REP. No. 1754, 84th Cong., 2d
(1956).
43 U.S.C. §§ 485b-1, 485d, 485e, 4 85g, 485h, 485i (1976).
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Reclamation Laws Authorizing Specific Projects
These problems of federalism arise not only from federal policies
applicable to all projects, but also from federal policies applicable
solely to individual projects. The Reclamation Act of 1902 and its
amendments only establish the foundation of the federal reclamation
program; the program is implemented by individual projects that are
authorized by individual acts of Congress. These authorizing acts create another set of federal policies that must be cranked into Congress'
overall reclamation scheme, and that increase the potential conflict
with state policies under section 8. For instance, the authorizing acts
typically describe the basic purposes of the individual project, such as
irrigation and power. 82 The acts do not, however, typically describe
how these purposes are to be achieved, or how much water is to be
impounded and allocated for each purpose. 83 The details of the project
operation are often, but in varying degrees of specificity, set forth in
feasibility and engineering studies prepared by federal authorities prior
to congressional authorization; these studies are often incorporated by
reference in the authorizing act,8 4 but the act usually requires only that
the project be operated "substantially" in conformity with the studies.8 5
The authorizing act also often vests federal reclamation officials with
broad discretion to carry forth certain project purposes. For instance,
the act authorizing the New Melones Project provides that the Secretary of the Army, who is responsible for building the project, shall
adopt "appropriate" measures to protect fish and wildlife and shall
"give consideration . . . to the advisability" of providing for water
quality control.8 6 Thus, Congress often gives ample attention to federal
powers when it authorizes an individual project but little attention to
state powers under section 8. This result adds to the difficulty of determining the effect of section 8 on the project.
Thus, Congress' reclamation objectives vary widely in terms of
their specificity, clarity, and importance. Further, Congress has given
the Secretary of the Interior authority over much of the same subject
82. See, e.g., Flood Control Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-874, 76 Stat. 1191-1192 (1962)
(New Melones Project); Boulder Canyon Project Act, Pub. L. No. 70-642, 45 Stat. 1057
(1928) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 617 (1976)) (Boulder Canyon Project); Pub. L. No. 87-590,
§ 1, 76 Stat. 389 (1962) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 616 (1976)) (Fryingpan-Arkansas Project).
83. See sources cited in note 82 supra.
84. See, e.g., Flood Control Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-874, 76 Stat. 1191 (New
Melones Project); Pub. L. No. 87-590, § l(b), 76 Stat. 389 (Fryingpan-Arkansas Project);
Pub. L. No. 78-534, 58 Stat. 901 (1944) (Isabella Reservoir).

85.

See sources cited in note 84 supra.

86.

Flood Control Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-874, 76 Stat. 1191-1192 (1962).
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matter that is reserved to state control under section 8. Therefore, as
Congress has expanded the federal role in reclamation, it has cast
doubts on the state role.
Judicial Interpretation of Section 8
Turning to the cases interpreting federal and state powers in the
field of reclamation, it is clear that several disparate traditions and
forces were at work. On the one hand, a federal tradition, followed in
the West in the last century and apparently continued under the federal
reclamation program by section 8, contemplated a broad state role in
the allocation of water. On the other hand, the broad judicial definition of federal constitutional powers to control water, although not
strictly relevant to whether Congress had surrendered its power to the
states, established an unfavorable climate for a broad interpretation of
state power. Moreover, the development of substantive reclamation
policies by Congress and federal executive officials further compounded the difficulties in defining the scope of state power. As the
following discussion makes clear, the Supreme Court originally followed the federal tradition that recognized broad state control of water,
then, contemporaneously with its expansion of federal power over
water in other areas, expanded federal power over waters in the field of
reclamation, and finally, in the New Melones case, followed the federal
tradition of state control once more.
Early Reclamation Cases
In the early reclamation cases, the Supreme Court, without directly facing the question, suggested that section 8 vests the states with
broad control of federal water uses. In Kansas v. Colorado, 7 decided
in 1907, the Court implied that the federal government may lack constitutional power, at least under the Property Clause, to acquire water
for its reclamation projects without following state law;88 this result
suggests that section 8 authorizes the states to control project water for
nonnavigation purposes. In its later decisions in Nebraska v.
Wyoming,8 9 decided in 1935 and 1945, the Court declined to rule further on the constitutional issue, stating that the issue was academic because the United States had acquired its water rights under state law in
87.
88.
89.

206 U.S. 46 (1907).
Id. at 85-94; see note 53 supra.
295 U.S. 40 (1935); 325 U.S. 589 (1945).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 30

that case. 90 In the 1935 decision, however, it commented briefly that
section 8 requires the United States to obtain "permits and priorities"
for its water rights under state law and provides for state control of the
impoundment and release of project water. 9' In the 1945 case, the
Court commented that the United States, having acquired its water
rights under state law, had complied with the congressional "directive"
in section 8.92 The Court sounded a cautionary note, however, stating
that "we do not suggest that where Congress has provided a system of
regulation for federal projects, it must give away before an inconsistent
state system. '

93

Although this comment was not amplified, it implied

that state control under section 8 is not absolute but is limited by Congress' own national policies.
Later Reclamation Cases
In later reclamation cases, decided during the Warren Court era,
the Court reversed its earlier direction. Departing from the federal tradition that recognized state control of water, the Court held that section
8 does not provide any authority for the states to regulate federal water
uses in the field of reclamation.
In Ivanhoe IrrigationDistrict v. McCracken,94 the Court faced the

question whether section 8 authorizes a state to override the acreage
limitation contained in the Reclamation Act of 1902. The Court had
little difficulty with this question. It ruled that the acreage limitation
was a "specific and mandatory" provision of the reclamation laws, that
it "has represented national policy for over a half century," and that
Congress must have meant for this important policy to override the
general authority of the states under section 8.95 Accordingly, the
Court concluded, the states cannot require project water to be delivered
to lands that are not in compliance with the acreage limitation. If the
Court had stopped at this point, it would have established the defensible proposition that state law under section 8 cannot contravene specific congressional policy.
The Court went further, however, and although disclaiming the
intention of "passing generally on the coverage of section 8 in the deli90. 325 U.S. at 614-16.
91. 295 U.S. at 42, 43.
92. 325 U.S. at 614-15.
93. Id. at 615-16.
94. 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
95. Id. at 291-92. But cf. Mallory, With No Need for Homesteading, 160-Acre Law is
Hopelessly Outdated, Los Angeles Times, Mar. 25, 1979, § 5, at 3, col. 1 (growers'

viewpoint).
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cate area of federal-state relations in the irrigation field,"' 96 proceeded
to do just that. It stated in dictum:
As we read § 8, it merely requires the United States to comply with
state law when, in the construction and operation of a reclamation
project, it becomes necessary for it to acquire water rights or vested
interests therein. But the acquisition of water rights must not be confused with the operation of federal projects. . . We read nothing in
§ 8 that compels the97United States to deliver water on conditions imposed by the state.

The Ivanhoe dictum, by suggesting that state law applies under
section 8 only when the United States "acquires" water and not when it
"delivers" water, created a distinction between the appropriation and

distribution of water, between its acquisition and its use.98 One difficulty with the distinction is that an important purpose of the states'
appropriation laws is to provide for the most beneficial use of water. 99
Thus, the appropriation and distribution of water under state appropriation laws are part of the same process.
The effect of the Ivanhoe distinction is that the states would be

allowed to process applications for water rights filed by the United
States, but not to regulate the use of the water. This result would enable the states to determine whether there is sufficient unappropriated
water to serve the federal right. It would also enable the states to assign

a priority to the United States based on the date of its application,
thereby preventing the disruption to the states' water systems that

would result if the United States were allowed to simply acquire water
without filing an application. °° The result would not, however, permit
96. 357 U.S. at 292.
97. Id. at 291-92.
98. This same distinction was suggested by the lower appellate court in the New
Melones litigation, which ruled that § 8 requires federal compliance with the "forms" but
not the "substance" of the states' water laws. See United States v. California, 558 F.2d 1347
(9th Cir. 1977), rev'd,438 U.S. 645 (1978).
99. See text accompanying notes 16-21 supra.
100. This disruption would result because the United States could acquire water without
regard to other established priorities of state law and be able to claim that its rights are
superior to rights that have priority under state law. In this event, a private user, although
having obtained a priority under state law, would have no assurance that the United States
might not subsequently claim an earlier priority to the same water based on the date that the
federal project was authorized by Congress. Cf Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128,
138 (1976) (water rights vest in the federal government on the date the underlying land is
reserved for a federal purpose). Further, if the United States were not required to obtain a
priority by filing an application under state law, the state would not know the amount of
unappropriated water necessary to serve the federal right or the amount of its other unappropriated waters that are available for use by private users. Without this knowledge, the
state would not know whether to grant or deny new applications for water rights by private
users.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 30

the states to exercise regulatory control of water; they could not require
as a condition of the appropriation that the water be distributed in a
way that results in the best use of water as determined by the state. The
dictum, making no reference to the 1902 congressional debates which
explained that the states were to have this regulatory control, 10 was
hardly a model of statutory analysis. Since the Court had contemporaneously expanded federal control of water in other areas, the Ivanhoe
dictum might be explained as extending, apriori,the concept of federal
control to the field of reclamation.
The Ivanhoe dictum provided the basis of the Supreme Court's
later decision in City of Fresno v. Caifornia.0 2 There the Court held
that the United States is authorized under the Reclamation Act of 1902
to acquire private water rights by condemnation, notwithstanding state
laws that effectively prevent condemnation of the rights.' 0 3 The Court
might have considered whether the state laws conflicted with specific
congressional policy, as in Ivanhoe it had held that a state law conflicted with the acreage limitation policy. Instead, the Court ruled simply that the United States is not required to comply with state law when
it exercises its condemnation powers under the Reclamation Act of
1902; the effect of section 8 is merely to require the United States to pay
compensation for the loss of the rights, as the value is defined under
state law. 04 According to the decision, this issue had already been settled in Ivanhoe. 10 5 In the Ivanhoe dictum, however, the Court indicated that state law applies only when the United States acquires water,
not when it delivers water. In Fresno, the Court held that state law
does not even apply when the United States acquires water, at least
when it acquires water by condemnation. Thus, Fresno went beyond
Ivanhoe by casting doubts on the role of state law even with respect to
federal acquisition of water.
Finally, in Arizona v. California,10 6 the Supreme Court rejected the
claims of Arizona and California that the states were authorized to ap101. See notes 9-12 & accompanying text supra.
102. 372 U.S. 627 (1963).
103. The state laws provided for, first, a priority for water uses for municipal purposes
over agricultural purposes, and, second, a priority for water users in the county and watershed where the water originates. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1460, 11460, 11463 (West 1971); 372
U.S. at 628. The Court noted that the first state law, providing for a priority of municipal
uses over agricultural uses, is directly contrary to the priorities contained in the federal
reclamation laws. 43 U.S.C. § 485h(c) (1976); 372 U.S. at 630; see text accompanying notes
126-27 infra.

104.
105.
106.

372 U.S. at 630.
Id.
373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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ply conditions on the delivery of water from the Boulder Canyon Project, a series of reclamation works on the Colorado River. The states'
claims were based on provisions of the Boulder Canyon Project Act
(BCPA) 0 7 which, in effect, incorporated the provisions of section 8 of
the Reclamation Act of 1902. Citing its dictum in Ivanhoe, which now
began to acquire a life of its own, the Court concluded that section 8
does not require the United States "in the delivery of water to follow
priorities laid down by state law."' 0 8 Moreover, the Court purported to
find a conflict between section 8 of the 1902 Act and provisions of the
BCPA which authorize the Secretary of the Interior to enter into contracts with water users; 09 since the Secretary was authorized to contract for the distribution of water, the Court stated, the states were
powerless to fix any limitations on the distribution of water." 0 The
Court thus appeared to suggest that Congress, in providing the Secretary with discretionary authority to fulfill the purposes of its reclamation program, negated whatever regulatory authority it might have
given the states in section 8.
The New Melones Decision
In the New Melones case, the Supreme Court provided for the first
time a comprehensive definition of the relationship between federal
and state power in the field of reclamation. The United States had applied to the State of California for permits to appropriate water for the
New Melones Project, a new reclamation facility on California's
Stanislaus River. Although the State issued the permits, it imposed
conditions therein that limited the amount of water that could be impounded by the project, on grounds that the United States had failed to
develop a plan for water uses for the project and that full impoundment
would destroy the recreational value of an upstream stretch of whitewater that was widely used for rafting and canoeing. The State reserved jurisdiction to authorize full impoundment when the United
States developed a plan for water use that was satisfactory to the State.
The United States brought a lawsuit against California, asserting that
California lacked jurisdiction to impose any condition on the acquisition and use of project water, assuming that there is sufficient water
for the project. California argued that its jurisdiction to impose such
43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617t, 617m, 617q (1976).
373 U.S. at 586.
43 U.S.C. § 617d (1976).
110. 373 U.S. at 587-88.

107.
108.
109.
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conditions derived from section 8."'
The Supreme Court followed the forces of history and tradition
rather than the influence of stare decisis. Rather than follow its own
precedents in Ivanhoe, Fresno, and Arizona, it examined the pre-1902
federal tradition that recognized state control of water, the language
and legislative history of the 1902 Act, and the post-1902 federal administrative practice in following state water laws." 2 The Court,
speaking through Justice Rehnquist, concluded that section 8 requires
the United States to comply with state water laws relating to the appropriation of water, even when such state laws condition its use." 3 Thus,
the United States must not only follow state procedures in filing applications for water rights, but must also follow state laws that substantively regulate water uses; it must comply with state laws relating to
both appropriation and distribution of water. The Court overruled
those portions of its decisions in Ivanhoe, Fresno, and Arizona that
reached an opposite result.1 ' 4
Justice White's dissenting opinion did not challenge the historical
analysis of the majority opinion. Instead, it objected that the "present
temporal majority" of the Court had engaged in "revisionary zeal" by
overruling the Court's prior decisions. 1 5 These prior decisions, however, paid no heed to the historical forces that produced section 8 or
that followed in its wake, and thus were not without their own revision11l. See United States v. California, 403 F. Supp. 874, 877-82 (E.D. Cal. 1975), aft'd,
558 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 645 (1978); Decision 1422, CAL. WATER
RESOURCES CONTROL BD., at 14, 15-16, 17-18, 23-24, 26-30 (Apr. 4, 1973). The conflict
between California and the United States over the New Melones Project is merely part of a
long-standing dispute between these sovereignties over the proper scope and objectives of
the federal reclamation program. The federal government, under the Secretary of the Interior, has traditionally sought to use water under the program primarily for the purpose of
stimulating economic growth, by providing water and power to farmers, cities, and industries. In recent years, California, under its Water Resources Control Board, has sought to
use a substantial portion of such water to protect the environment that is threatened by the
program. California has required water to be released from federal dams to protect downstream water quality and fish and wildlife, and has limited impoundment of water in the
dams to protect upstream environmental resources. See Decision 1400, CAL. WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BD. (Apr. 11, 1972); Decision 1379, CAL. WATER RESOURCES CONTROL
BD. (July 28, 1971); Note, The Delta Water Rights Decision, 2 ECOL. L.Q. 733 (1972). Thus,
the New Melones case not only raises fundamental questions of federalism concerning control of water in the West; it also raises fundamental questions about the extent to which the
federal reclamation program should be operated to achieve economic growth at the expense
of environmental degradation.
112. 438 U.S. at 653-70.
113. Id. at 665-68, 670-75.
114. Id. at 674.
115. Id. at 679-93 (White, J., dissenting).
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ary effect. Indeed, these prior decisions had themselves departed from
earlier decisions which had gone the other way. By reestablishing the
federal tradition that underlay section 8, the majority opinion might be
defended on grounds that it followed history once more, rather than
revised it once again.
In any event, the majority further concluded that section 8 requires
the United States to follow state law when it acquires private water
rights by condemnation, not just when it acquires unappropriated
water." 6 The Court thus overruled the contrary part of its decision in
Fresno.'17 Since the United States had not acquired water by condemnation in the New Melones case, the Court was not called on to rule on
this additional question. It would have been anomalous, however, if
the United States were required to follow state law in acquiring unappropriated water but not in acquiring water by condemnation. Section
8 does not distinguish between these kinds of water in providing for
state control, and the states have an interest in regulating both kinds of
water. By going beyond the facts of the case to define the nature of the
federal condemnation power, the Court avoided an anomaly that
would have resulted in confusion and, most likely, litigation.
Having ruled that section 8 requires federal compliance with state
regulatory law, the Court turned to the more difficult question of
resolving conflicts between federal and state reclamation policies.
Adopting the position urged by California, the Court stated that section
8 requires federal compliance with state law only when the state law is
not inconsistent with "clear congressional directives."' 18 The Court's
decision, if inconsistent with the Ivanhoe dictum, is consistent with the
Ivanhoe holding that a state law is invalid if it conflicts with Congress'
acreage limitation policy.
The Court appeared to suggest at one point that, according to the
congressional debates relating to section 8, Congress meant to avoid
conflicts between federal and state policies by requiring the United
States to obtain its water rights prior to congressional authorization of a
project.' '9 Under this view, if state law does not authorize the United
States to obtain water for the project, Congress would simply not authorize the project and conflicts between federal and state policies
would not occur. In modern practice, however, the United States often
acquires its water rights for a project after, rather than before, a project
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 671 n.24.
Id.
Id. at 668-69 n.21, 672-75.
Id. at 668-69 n.21.
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is authorized. 120 This practice might change, of course, as a result of
the Court's decision. The appropriation laws of some states, however,
authorize the states, in granting water rights, to reserve jurisdiction to
impose conditions on the use of water at a future time, as water needs
change.' 2 1 Thus, it is not always possible to fully define the nature of
the federal water right at the time that the project is authorized by Congress. Accordingly, although Congress in 1902 may have expected that
federal-state conflicts would be worked out prior to congressional authorization of the project, the modern appropriation doctrine does not
always permit that result. Since such conflicts cannot always be
avoided, they must be resolved by judicial rules of statutory construction, absent a congressional rule for resolving them. In ruling that the
conflicts must be resolved in favor of Congress' specific policies, the
Court limited the extent of its departure from its past precedents and
insured the prevalence of specific national interests over parochial state
interests.
The New Melones decision thus restores the federal tradition to
western water law. By providing for state regulatory control of water to
the extent not inconsistent with national objectives mandated by Congress, it provides an accommodation of federal and state interests that
is the essence of federalism. Indeed, at least in the field of reclamation,
the federal tradition can be justified on the basis of modem as well as
historical values. Water from federal reclamation projects is not used
primarily for usual federal purposes, such as nourishing federal forests
or Indian reservations. Rather, the water is used primarily by local
economic interests, by farmers, cities, and industries, and its use
120. For instance, the Central Valley Project, which consists of a coordinated series of
federal dams, reservoirs, and waterways in California, was authorized by the Rivers and
Harbors Acts of 1935 and 1937. See ch. 831. 49 Stat. 1028 (1935); ch. 832, § 2, 50 Stat. 844,
850 (1937). In obtaining its right to appropriate water for the project, the United States filed
applications for permits and for assignment of state-filed applications subsequent to congressional authorization of the project. See H.R. Doc. No. 246, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957), in II
ENGLE, CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT DOCUMENTS 543-47 (1957). A different procedure,
however, was followed with respect to the Central Arizona Project, a series of reclamation
facilities in Arizona that will utilize the interstate waters of the Colorado River. Congress
initially refused Arizona's request to build the project on the grounds that Arizona had
failed to establish that it had the right to obtain sufficient water for the project, as against
California's claims to superior water rights in the Colorado River. Accordingly, Arizona
brought a lawsuit against California to obtain recognition of its rights. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). After Arizona succeeded in establishing its rights in that case,
Congress then authorized the Central Arizona Project. Colorado River Basin Project Act,
Pub. L. No. 90-537, 82 Stat. 885, 887 (1968) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1521 (1976)); see E.
COOPER, AQUEDUCT EMPIRE 309-11 (1968).
121. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 1394 (West 1971).
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thereby affects the economic growth and development of the state in
which the water arises and flows. Its use also affects the state's environ-

mental quality; it determines the quality of its waters, the abundance of
its fish and game, and its recreational values.1 22 These local impacts

justify a substantial measure of local control. There is, of course, a
large national interest in the water, since the water results in the production of foods and goods that reach national markets. There is no
federal interest, however, that bars the states from controlling the water
to the extent that these national interests are not impaired. Since the
states have an interest in controlling the water within the larger na-

tional interest and since the national interest is not impaired by this
result, a proper application of federal principles would allow the state
interest to be served.
Indeed, since the western states traditionally controlled the allocation of water to local economic interests, it would be anomalous if the
states had no control over the allocation of water to these interests

under the federal reclamation program. Such an anomaly would create
two separate, unintegrated systems of water law in the western states,
one under exclusive state control and the other under exclusive federal
control. 123 The New Melones decision results in an integration of these
different systems to the extent consistent with specific national policies.

Thus, although it rejects a unitary national system of water law in the
field of reclamation, the decision promotes substantial uniformity in
the water law systems of each state.

Congressional "Directives": New Problems of Federalism
Rather than resolving all problems of federalism arising under the
122. See, e.g., Robie, Some Reflections on EnvironmentalConsiderationsin Water Rights
Administration, 2 ECOL. L.Q. 695 (1972).
123. For instance, California has built its own water distribution system, the State Water
Project, that utilizes many of the same distribution facilities as the federal system, and that
results in distribution of water to many areas that are also served by the federal system.
Because of the parallel facilities and goals of these systems, there is a need for maximum
coordination of the systems. In particular, the waters released from both systems eventually
collect in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, an area with valuable ecological interests and
agricultural uses; part of the water from both systems is used by Delta interests, and part is
exported to agricultural users in the Central Valley. There is a continuing dispute between
federal and state authorities over how much water should be allocated from the projects for
use in the Delta, and how much exported to the Central Valley. See Note, The Delta Water
Rights Decision, 2 ECOL. L.Q. 733, 738-42 (1973). Because the New Melones decision allows
California, within the limits of national policy, to apply the same conditions on the federal
system that it applies on the state system, the decision will doubtlessly result in greater coordination of the federal and state projects with respect to water allocations between Delta
interests and non-Delta interests.
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federal reclamation laws, the New Melones decision inevitably opens
the door to new problems. The Court failed to define the kinds of congressional "directives" that will be deemed to override state law; it remanded the case to the lower courts for determination of that question
under the facts of the case. As the courts grappled for many years with
the question whether state laws can limit federal water uses, they must
now grapple with the question whether state laws are inconsistent with
congressional "directives." Although it is difficult to develop a comprehensive list of the specific problems that may be encountered in such
inquiries, it is possible to identify two major problem areas involving,
first, the limits of discretionary powers of federal administrative officials and, second, the limits of state authority to allocate water.
Discretionary Powers of Federal Reclamation Officials
As noted earlier, 24 much of the difficulty in resolving conflicts between federal and state policies arises from the fact that Congress has
entrusted the Secretary of the Interior with broad discretionary powers,
overlapping state powers under section 8, to carry forth the purposes of
the federal reclamation program. In the New Melones case, the Court,
after reviewing the congressional acts that vest such discretionary
powers in the Secretary, concluded that the Secretary "should follow
state law in all respects not directly inconsistent with these [congressional] directives."'' 25 By this statement, the Court appeared to hold
that Congress meant to authorize the Secretary to take those steps necessary to carry forth congressionally mandated purposes, but not to immunize him from state laws that are not substantively inconsistent with
these congressional purposes. Therefore, the Secretary's administrative
powers do not displace state powers under section 8. The Secretary
cannot develop a body of substantive administrative policies that are
superior to state law; state law must be followed in signing contracts
with water users, adopting rules and regulations, and taking other action, unless the state law is inconsistent with the substantive congressional policy that is being carried out.
It is not always easy, however, to determine whether a substantive
policy owes its origin to Congress or the Secretary. An example of this
difficulty can be found in the Reclamation Project Act of 1939,126
which provides that water cannot be made available for municipal or
power purposes unless, "in the judgment of the Secretary," its use will
124.
125.
126.

See text accompanying notes 68-86 supra.
438 U.S. at 678.
43 U.S.C. §§ 485-485k (1976).
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not impair the agricultural purposes of the project. 127 Has Congress
established a policy for the priority of agricultural uses over municipal
and power uses? If so, does the Secretary have exclusive authority to
carry out this policy? The answer to the first question, it seems, lies in
determining whether Congress has mandated federal officials to carry
out a specific policy or instead has remained neutral on the matter.
The answer to the second question, it seems, is that if Congress has
mandated federal officials to carry out a specific policy, the Secretary
must still comply with state law unless the state law prevents the substantive policy from being achieved.
The 1939 Act illustrates this resolution. By requiring federal officials to provide for a priority of agricultural uses over municipal and
power purposes, the Act appears to establish such a priority as a matter
of congressional policy. This congressional policy would override state
law. The Secretary, however, must follow state laws that regulate the
allocation of water between agricultural, municipal, and power purposes unless the state law upsets the congressional priority by impairing
the agricultural purposes of the project. The Secretary cannot override
state law on the grounds that, in the Secretary's judgment, the state law
will have that effect; the decision, if necessary, must be made in the
courts, not by the Secretary.
Another example is found in the Flood Control Act of 1962,128
which authorizes the New Melones Project. As noted earlier' 29 the Act
mandates the Secretary of the Army to adopt "appropriate" measures
for the protection of fish and wildlife and to "give consideration" to the
"advisability" of providing for water quality control.130 The Act appears to provide for the protection of fish and wildlife as a matter of
congressional policy, which would override state policy. The Secretary,
however, must comply with state laws on this subject unless such laws
fail to protect fish and wildlife; the Secretary cannot ignore state laws
by simply claiming that, in the Secretary's judgment, the state laws will
not protect fish and wildlife. On the other hand, the Act, in authorizing
the Secretary to "give consideration" to the "advisability" of providing
for water quality control, does not appear to establish water quality
control as a matter of congressional policy; instead, the Act appears to
contemplate an administrative decision on whether the project should
127.
128.
suipra.
129.
130.

43 U.S.C. § 485h(c) (1976).
Pub. L. No. 87-874, § 203, 76 Stat. 1191-92 (1962); see text accompanying note 82
See text accompanying note 82 supra.
Pub. L. No. 87-874, § 203, 76 Stat. 1191-92 (1962).
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achieve this purpose. Hence, congressional policy on this matter is apparently neutral. Accordingly, state law can require or forbid project
water to be used for this purpose.
However, Congress can undoubtedly make it clear that federal administrative officials are to have exclusive authority to achieve Congress' substantive goals, and that they may override state laws
regardless of their consistency with the substantive goals. One such example might be found in the Flood Control Act of 1944, which authorizes the Secretary of the Army to adopt regulations for flood control
functions of federal projects.13 ' The flood control function is an outgrowth of the navigation power that has been traditionally exercised by
the federal government. Accordingly, it is likely that Congress, in providing for federal regulation of the flood control function, meant to
insure that this function would be exclusively controlled by the federal
government, not the states. Indeed, California has historically taken
the position that the flood control function is under exclusive federal
control, and that the states may not limit the impoundment and release
of water for that purpose. 32 Therefore, whatever the states' authority
to control water for other project purposes, their authority may not extend to the flood control function. It so, this result follows from the fact
that Congress has indicated with sufficient clarity that this matter is
under exclusive federal control.
To summarize, the applicability of state laws in this context depends on an analysis of Congress' substantive goals and the means by
which the goals are to be achieved. If Congress has not directed that a
particular result be achieved, the state law is applicable. If Congress
has directed that a result be achieved and has not clearly indicated t-at
the states are powerless to achieve it, the state law is applicable unless it
bars the result. Federal officials cannot ignore the state law on the
ground that the matter lies solely within the province of federal officials. If Congress has directed that a result be achieved, however, and
has clearly indicated that the matter is within the exclusive control of
federal officials, the state law is inapplicable. In short, if federal officials can comply with the substantive goals of both Congress and the
states, they must do so unless Congress clearly indicates otherwise.
State Allocation of Water
Another question arises in determining the states' authority to al131.

Flood Control Act of 1944, Ch. 665, 58 Stat. 887, 890 (1944).
CAL. WATER RIGHTS BD., at 64 (June 2, 1959).

132. Decision 935,
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1 33
locate water from individual reclamation projects. As noted earlier,'
when authorizing a project, Congress usually specifies its general purposes but fails to specify how the water is to be allocated among differ-

ent purposes and among different users. This practice might change as
a result of the New Melones decision. In any event, assuming that Congress has not expressly stated its intent, what are the limits of state

power to allocate water among different project purposes and among
different users?
Assuming that Congress has constitutional authority to acquire
water for project purposes, a state cannot deny water for any project
purpose described in the authorizing act. 134 Accordingly, it cannot indirectly achieve the same result by allocating so much water for some
purposes, such as water quality control, that insufficient water is available for other purposes, such as agriculture. At what point is there an
insufficient allocation of water for a particular purpose? The answer to
this question is not found in the federal reclamation laws. Perhaps the
answer can be found in the normal federal judicial rules pertaining to
the scope of judicial review of administrative decisions. Under these

rules, factual findings contained in an administrative decision will be
sustained on judicial review if supported by substantial evidence, based
on the record before the administrative agency. 135 Therefore, a state

administrative scheme to allocate water from federal reclamation
133. See text accompanying notes 82-86 supra.
134. However, water impounded for primary project purposes, such as irrigation, is
often used for subsidiary project purposes, such as power and recreation. See, e.g., H.R.
Doc. No. 453, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 50, 51, 52 (1962) (New Melones Project). If a state is
authorized to defer impoundment of water for the primary irrigation purpose, can it thereby
defer impoundment of water for a subsidiary purpose such as power to the extent that both
purposes are served by the same quantity of water? The states' argument is that power is
"subsidiary to reclamation," and is "only available where the storage dam raises the water to
a sufficient level." 84 CONG. REC. 10220 (1939). The opposite argument is that power is
frequently necessary to generate project revenues, and thus make the project economically
feasible. This question is now raised on the remand of the New Melones case, since California deferred the full impoundment of water for power purposes on grounds that water
should not be fully impounded for irrigation purposes. See United States v. California, No.
S-3014 (E.D. Cal.).
135. See, e.g., Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 618-21 (1966); FPC
v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 586 (1942); Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U.S. 570 (1941); 4 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 29.08, 29.09,
at 153-80 (1958). Formerly, the federal courts adhered to the view that, in reviewing an
administrative decision, the courts would apply the "independent judgment" test rather than
the "substantial evidence" test with respect to "fundamental, jurisdictional" issues, and further would require a trial de novo with respect to such issues. See Crowell v. Benson, 285
U.S. 22 (1932); Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920). These
cases are apparently no longer good law, however. 4 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 29.08, 29.09, at 156, 167 (1958).
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projects should be sustained to the extent that factual findings therein
are supported by substantial evidence in the state administrative proceeding. An argument that the state scheme fails to provide sufficient
water to satisfy a project purpose should not be upheld if substantial
evidence supports the opposite conclusion. The states' authority to allocate water thus depends less on the substance than the procedure of
federal law, less on an analysis of substantive congressional policy than
on an application of judicial rules establishing a presumptive correctness of administrative decisions.
Although a state cannot deny water necessary to serve a purpose
mandated by Congress, it does not follow that a state cannot require
water to be allocated for a purpose not contemplated by Congress.
Suppose, for example, that a state requires water to be allocated for a
purpose, such as water quality control, that is not among the project
purposes listed in the authorizing act. It might be argued that, since
Congress has not included this purpose among the project purposes, it
has directed that water not be used for this purpose. It is more likely,
however, that Congress, by failing to mention the purpose, is neutral on
whether it should be fulfilled. Since Congress is neutral, the state can
require an allocation of water for the purpose. 36 Therefore, although
the states lack authority to subtract from the purposes contemplated by
Congress, they apparently have authority to add to such purposes.
The states' authority to require an allocation of water for purposes
not contemplated by Congress is stronger when the water is used for
the protection of the environment. Recent congressional acts, in establishing a "national policy" to protect the environment, direct the states
to bear the "primary responsibility" for achieving this policy and provide that federal laws, including those defining the obligations of fed37
eral agencies, shall be interpreted consistently with this policy.
These laws appear to suggest that the purposes of federal reclamation
projects shall, to the extent not inconsistent with other project purposes,
include environmental protection. Thus, even when Congress has not
specifically directed that water be used for environmental purposes in a
particular project, a state law requiring an allocation of water for such
purposes-far from not being in conflict with a congressional directive-may be mandated by congressional directives found in other
laws.
The states' authority to allocate water for environmental purposes,
136. See text accompanying notes 127-28 supra.
137. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4332 (1976); Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 4371(b) (1976).
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however, is subject to Congress' paramount concern for the economic
feasibility of the project. In the Reclamation Act of 1902, Congress
directed that the projects are to be economically feasible in the sense
that their costs are to be recovered by sales to water users. 38 Subsequent acts have provided that the cost of supplying water for most environmental purposes, such as protection of fish and wildlife, are to be
borne by consumers. 39 In this way, the consumers subsidize the environmental purposes of the projects, or at least mitigate their harmful
environmental effects. There is a point, however, at which so much
water could be allocated for environmental purposes that the price of
water to consumers is unreasonably or prohibitively high. If this point
is reached, the economic feasibility of the project is jeopardized, since
the project may not be able to generate the revenues necessary to pay
back project costs. Certainly the states lack authority to produce this
result by a massive allocation of water for environmental purposes.
Thus, although the states have broad authority to allocate water for
environmental purposes, their authority is limited by the need to insure
that project costs are repaid to the federal government.
To further insure the economic feasibility of its projects, Congress
has directed the Secretary of the Interior to prepare, prior to congressional authorization of the project, a feasibility report containing an
analysis of project benefits and costs.' 40 As a practical matter, the pro4
ject will not be authorized unless the benefits exceed the costs.' '
Therefore, the states cannot allocate water for environmental or other
purposes upon a showing that the allocation reduces benefits to less
than costs. It is less clear whether a state can reduce benefits to less
than those described in the feasibility report. It might be suggested that
the extent to which benefits exceed costs, not just the fact that benefits
exceed costs, influences Congress' decision to authorize the project and
thus limits the states' allocation authority. However, this conclusion is
not sufficiently clear to support such a limitation. Indeed, it is unlikely
that Congress insists that its projects achieve a particular level of bene138. 43 U.S.C. § 461 (1976).
139. Reclamation Project Act of 1939, 43 U.S.C. §§ 485h(a), (b) (1976); Water Project
Recreation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 4601-13(a), 4601-14(a) (1976).
140. Reclamation' Project Act of 1939, 43 U.S.C. § 487h(a) (1976). The project benefits
include certain environmental benefits, such as protection of fish and wildlife and water
quality control, that must be paid for by consumers. Sax, FederalReclamation Law in 2
CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 112.3(a), at 142 (R. Clark ed. 1967) [hereinafter
cited as Sax]. It is thus possible that a project may be economically feasible in the sense that
its benefits exceed its costs, but not in the sense that it is able to generate the revenues
necessary to pay back project costs.
141. Sax, supra note 140, § 112.2, at 138-40.
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fits. Congress' view of project benefits is usually flexible; it usually provides in its authorizing acts that the feasibility report sets only a general
direction to be followed by project operators, not a narrow pathway
from which they cannot stray. 42 Therefore, the states can apparently
allocate water to the point of reducing project benefits to less than those
described in the feasibility report, but not to less than costs.
Finally, the authority of state administrative authorities to allocate
water is subject to restraints under state law, beyond those imposed
under federal law. Most western states limit the discretionary powers
of state agencies to grant water rights by requiring that they determine
that the water right is consistent with the reasonable and beneficial use
of water. 143 Moreover, the states' laws provide that this determination
is subject to judicial review. 144 In some states, including California, the
state agency is required to conduct a public hearing when granting a
water right, and competing users are allowed to testify and present evidence. 14 5 These state legislative restraints limit state administrative
powers. Justice Douglas once lamented that if the authority to allocate
water belongs to the Secretary of the Interior rather than the states, the
Secretary would be able to assign water to "the most worthy Democrat
or Republican, as the case may be.'14 6 Whether this is so, the same
latitude does not belong to most state administrative authorities under
the states' own laws.
Conclusion
The New Melones decision results in a new federalism in the field
of reclamation, or, more exactly, a rebirth of the old federalism contemplated by Congress in 1902. The Court might have simply followed
its own recent precedents and ruled that the federal government can
control water that it develops, that it can regulate that which it subsidizes. Instead, the Court followed the revelations of history and experience. In keeping with the tradition of federalism underlying section 8,
the Court balanced and harmonized federal and state interests rather
than promulgated a pervasive federal supremacy. It manifestly fol142. See id. The authorizing act typically requires only that the project be operated
"substantially" in accordance with the feasibility report. See note 85 supra.
143. See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
144.

1 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 319-

21 (1974).
145. Id. at 323; CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1340-1359 (West 1971 & Supp. 1977). However,
California does not require a hearing on unprotested applications. CAL. WATER CODE
§ 1351 (West 1971).
146. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 630 (1963) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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lowed the policy judgments of Congress rather than its own policy
judgments, although the two may not have been dissimilar. As a result,
its decision is, at once, a triumph of diversity rather than uniformity of
national power, and of judicial restraint rather than judicial activism.
The decision reflects Justice Holmes' dictum that "[t]he life of the law
has not been logic: it has been experience."'' 47 In this case, the experience is found in the tradition of federalism.
There is an undoubted value in unitary federal control of water in
the field of reclamation, in that it avoids conflicts between federal and
state policies that lead to uncertainties and litigation. There is also a
value in the federal tradition, however, in allowing the states to control
water that affects their economy and environment. The Court opted
for the values of federalism in its New Melones decision, even at the
expense of causing uncertainties about the exact relationship of federal
and state power. Much uncertainty can perhaps be overcome by following the suggestions contained in this Article, particularly by giving
presumptive correctness to state administrative schemes for the allocation of water.
In any event, uncertainty about the exact relationship between
federal and state power is not new under our federal tradition. Rather,
it is the stuff of which the federal tradition is made. This tradition is
based on the concept that federal and state powers are relative rather
than absolute, that inquiries must be made into the nature and quality
of the federal interest to determine whether it should prevail over state
interests. This inquiry is common in other areas where federal and
48
state powers overlap and compete, as under the preemption doctrine, 1
and it is proper in the field of reclamation, where both federal and state
interests are at stake. The lack of precise definition of federal and state
powers resulting from the New Melones decision is the price that we
0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
148. Under the preemption doctrine, the validity of a state law depends on whether it
conflicts with a specific federal law, assuming that Congress has not occupied the field. See,
e.g., New York State Dep't of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973); Florida Lime
& Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963). Further, the applicability of the
federal antitrust laws to the states depends on the nature of the state interest, and whether
there are alternative ways in which the state interest can be served. Cantor v. Detroit Edison
Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). In the field of labor law, the
substantive law applicable in interpreting collective bargaining contracts is federal law,
which in turn depends on a mixture of federal and state policies. Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957). Under the Outer Continental Shelf Act, state laws are
applicable on the outer continental shelf to the extent not inconsistent with specific federal
laws. 43 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1976); Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1959).
147.
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pay for our constitutional tradition of federalism. By its willingness to
pay the price, the Court has served that tradition well.

